We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both social and private endowments. Popular applications include student assignment to on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and particular school choice problems. In a series of experiments Chen and Sönmez (American Economic Review 92: 1669-1686 , 2002 have shown that a popular mechanism from recent theory, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, induces a signi…cantly higher participation rate by agents with private endowments and leads to signi…cantly more e¢ cient outcomes than the most commonly used real-life mechanism, the Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights.
Introduction
In this paper we study the problem of assigning a set of indivisible goods, without explicitly using monetary transfers, to a set of agents some of whom may also have prior claims to some of the goods. More speci…cally, there exist two sets of objects: those that are socially owned and those that are privately owned. Agents have strict preferences over the objects. Three canonical examples 1 of this problem are on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and school choice for particular settings.
Many colleges o¤er on-campus housing opportunities to incoming as well as to already enrolled students. In on-campus housing, the goal is to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college campuses. 2 Students consist of incoming freshmen and more senior students. Incoming freshmen do not initially occupy any rooms, and each senior student is the occupant of a room from the previous year. There are also vacant rooms which used to be occupied by the previous year's graduating class and have now become available for reallocation. Senior students are entitled to keep their room but may also apply for a new one. Another ingredient in this application is an exogenously given priority ordering of agents, which is usually determined according to the assignment policies of the central clearinghouse of the particular college, and could be, for example, based on seniority, GPA, the result of a lottery, or a combination of these.
The preferred treatment for the most serious forms of kidney disease is transplantation. Since there is a signi…cant shortage of deceased-donor kidneys compared to demand, 3 and because a healthy person can remain healthy on only one kidney, transplantation from a live-donor is also quite common. 4 Nevertheless, a willing donor may not always be able to donate to her intended patient due to blood-type or immunological incompatibilities. Rapaport (1986) proposed the idea of exchanging donors between two incompatible pairs if the donor of one pair can feasibly donate to the patient of the other pair. Until recently, however, feasible exchanges were sought in an unorganized and decentralized way in most parts of the United States. In a series of in ‡uential papers, 5 economists Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and Utku Ünver have proposed innovative ideas to implement kidney exchanges in an organized way through the lens of mechanism design:
In kidney exchange, there are patients initially paired with incompatible donors (the analogues in this context of "senior students with occupied rooms"in on-campus housing) who wish to receive a compatible kidney, and patients without any donors (the analogues in this context of "incoming freshmen" in on-campus housing). There are also options such as altruistic donors 6 and priority on the deceased donor waiting list (the analogues in this context of "vacant rooms"in on-campus housing). In this application, a priority ordering of patients is determined based on the seriousness of their medical conditions or their waiting-times. The mechanisms and their properties which we discuss in this paper have immediate counterparts in the context of kidney exchange.
Another common problem in the United States and elsewhere arises when a school district o¤ers students the option to attend public schools other than their neighborhood schools. In school choice, each student submits a rank-ordered-list of schools to a centralized clearing-house 3 For example, in 2002 there were about 3,400 patients who died while on the waiting list. In the same year, there were another 900 patients who became too ill to be eligible for transplantation. 4 For example, in 2004 there were 6,086 live-donor transplants in the U.S. 5 See Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004, 2005ab, 2007) . Also see Al Roth's Market Design blog for more recent developments on the current kidney exchange practices. 6 An altruistic donor is a non-directed living donor, also known as a Good Samaritan donor.
(e.g., school district), which then determines students'assignments based also on school-speci…c priorities. While other criteria may also play a role in determining school-speci…c priorities in general, 7 some places use residence exclusively as the sole determinant of priority. 8 For example, the Tokyo school district …rst gives each student the option to attend her neighborhood school (the analogue idea in this context of "a senior student keeping the room she initially occupies" of on-campus housing); if the student chooses otherwise, then she participates in the centralized assignment process. 9 In the remainder of the paper, for convenience, we shall use the on-campus housing application as our running example. In keeping with this, we refer to the indivisible goods that are socially owned as vacant houses and to those that are privately owned as occupied houses. Each agent is either a newcomer who does not currently own a house, or an existing tenant who currently owns an occupied house and may be seeking a better one. Given the …xed resources, a house allocation problem (with existing tenants) is characterized by two pieces of information: (1) a priority ordering over all agents; and (2) a list of preferences of each agent over houses, typically a rank-ordered-list of houses that each agent decides on by comparing di¤erent housing types
available. An assignment mechanism is a systematic procedure that chooses an assignment of agents to available houses based on the two pieces of information. The present paper takes a theoretical as well as an experimental approach to this problem.
By and large, the performance of a mechanism is evaluated along four merits: (1) individual rationality (i.e., an existing tenant should be encouraged to participate by giving her the guarantee of obtaining a house that is no worse than her occupied house); (2) e¢ ciency (i.e., resources should be optimally allocated according to the preferences of agents); (3) fairness (i.e., the assignment should respect the priority order); and (4) incentive compatibility (i.e., each agent should be 7 In Boston, for example, the priorities are assigned based on walk zone and whether the student has a sibling enrolled at the particular school. A random lottery draw is also commonly used to break ties within priority groups. 8 In most places in the U.S., the highest priority for a particular school is given to those students who reside within the walk zone of the school. However, even in places where "proximity" is not the only determinant of priority, a student often has a high chance of admission at her neighborhood school should she decide to list it as her …rst choice. In this sense, most students are typically entitled to attend their neighborhood schools if they wish to (unless perhaps if these schools are extremely popular). Hence, even more general school choice problems can be viewed as similar to the present problem. 9 We thank Yosuke Yasuda and Fuhito Kojima for bringing this example to our attention.
induced to act straightforwardly and reveal her true preferences). Among these criteria, individual rationality is of critical importance. This is because lack of participation by existing tenants can entail a loss of potentially large gains from trade. Furthermore, ensuring high participation by existing tenants not only is appealing in the context of on-campus housing but is also vital for the sustenance and proper-functioning of a kidney transplant center. Indeed, it may not be reasonable to expect a kidney patient to commit to a transplant that has a smaller chance of success than the one through her own intended donor.
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A widely used mechanism is the so-called random serial dictatorship with squatting rights (RSD). 11 RSD works as follows: First, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the house assignment process, or keep her occupied house. The houses of those who choose to enter become available for allocation together with the vacant houses. Second, the centralized clearing house, e.g., the housing o¢ ce, randomly determines the priority ordering of all participating agents from a given distribution (which may simply be uniform, or may favor some students because of a speci…c university policy). Finally, available houses are allocated to agents based on the priority ordering: The …rst agent is assigned her top choice, the second agent is assigned her top choice among the remaining houses, and so on.
While quite popular, RSD has a serious shortcoming: It is not individually rational. Since it cannot guarantee an existing tenant a house at least as good as her current one, existing tenants may show reluctance to participate under such a mechanism, which in turn may result in e¢ -ciency losses. Abdulkadiroglu and , arguing that some of these e¢ ciency losses can be recovered if existing tenants are instead allowed to trade their houses through a market-like procedure, proposed the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism. 12 TTC is individually rational, Pareto e¢ cient, and incentive compatible (Abdulkadiroglu and . Remarkably, a follow-up experimental study by Chen and Sönmez (2002) found TTC to lead to higher participation rates 10 Given the obvious importance of the size of the central kidney pool, participation is probably one of the most important considerations in the kidney exchange context with many lives at stake. 11 Some examples include undergraduate housing at the University of Pennsylvania, Carnegie Mellon, Duke, Northwestern, and the University of Michigan. 12 The idea of top trading cycles was originally proposed by David Gale (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) . Also see Sönmez and Ünver (2005) for a study on the relationship between between TTC and the core; and Sönmez and Ünver (2010) for an interesting characterization of TTC. and to more e¢ cient outcomes than the widely used RSD.
After being advocated as a promising school choice mechanism by economists Atila Abdulkadiro¼ glu, Parag Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez, the well-known Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism of two-sided matching theory has gained increasing popularity among school districts in the United States, and has recently replaced two de…cient mechanisms in New York City (Abdulkadiro¼ glu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005) and Boston (Abdulkadiro¼ glu, Pathak, Roth, and . Motivated by the success of the Gale-Shapley mechanism in numerous 13 other matching markets, this paper o¤ers a natural and intuitive adaptation of the Gale-Shapley mechanism to house allocation. Our main result shows that this adaptation of the Gale-Shapley (GS) mechanism is indeed equivalent to a real-life mechanism, the so-called New House 4 (NH4), which has already been in use at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for about three decades (Theorem 1). This result has important implications. First, it shows that NH4 ful…lls important desirable properties such as (dominant strategy) incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and fairness (Corollary 1). Second and more critically, it shows that NH4 is Pareto superior to any individually rational and fair mechanism (Corollary 2). Third, it shows that NH4 is essentially the unique incentive compatible, individually rational, and fair mechanism (Corollary 3).
We show that no mechanism can be individually rational, Pareto e¢ cient, and fair (Proposition 1). The three mechanisms we discussed, however, serve to show that any other three properties can be satis…ed simultaneously. 14 From a theoretical point of view, TTC has the edge in terms of e¢ ciency and NH4 in terms of fairness. Despite their theoretical appeal, it is important to know how the two mechanisms perform in controlled laboratory experiments in order to make better-informed policy recommendations. We designed a laboratory experiment to compare the performance of NH4 with that of the leading theory mechanism TTC, with speci…c attention to the participation decisions of existing tenants and the e¢ ciency of the outcomes. In terms of existing 13 Probably one of the best-known such markets is the redesigned National Resident Matching Program (Roth and Peranson, 1999) for assigning new physicians to hospital positions. Also see Roth and Rothblum (1999) for an extensive list of these markets.
14 Hence, RSD is Pareto e¢ cient, fair, and incentive compatible. The RSD allocation is Pareto e¢ cient only when restricted to the set of agents who participate in the assignment process, which is the e¢ ciency criterion we adopt throughout the paper. It may, however, be ine¢ cient without such a restriction. tenant participation, we found that under NH4 the participation rate is signi…cantly higher than under TTC.
When making e¢ ciency comparisons, the matching literature has thus far relied on only cardinal measures of e¢ ciency. 15 However, this is not directly in line with the theory because most mechanisms elicit only ordinal preferences. Furthermore, the commonly used e¢ ciency concept in the theoretical literature is Pareto e¢ ciency with respect to ordinal preference information, whereas the common e¢ ciency tests are based on the payo¤s of the subjects. In this paper, we also make a methodological contribution to the experimental matching literature by proposing an ordinal e¢ ciency test (OET). 16 The idea is simply based on using the Pareto criterion to compare each observed NH4 outcome with each observed TTC outcome. Observe that for any given two outcomes, only one of the following can hold: (a) the NH4 outcome Pareto dominates the TTC outcome; (b) the TTC outcome Pareto dominates the NH4 outcome; and (c) the two cannot be Pareto ranked. To make the ordinal e¢ ciency comparisons, we …rst considered 10,000 randomly generated priority orderings and then computed the number of cases where one mechanism's out- Finally, we conducted a second experiment to compare the two theoretically equivalent mechanisms NH4 and GS in a laboratory environment. Behavior was far from optimal as many existing tenants decided not to participate and a substantial proportion of individuals did not reveal their true preferences. However, NH4 and GS induced very similar behavior in the lab. Indeed, we did not …nd any signi…cant di¤erences between the two mechanisms in terms of participation, truthful 15 See, for example, Sönmez (2002, 2006) , Pais and Pintér (2008) , and Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (forthcoming). 16 We thank Jan Eeckhout (Editorial Board) and an anonymous referee for encouraging us to think in this direction.
preference revelation, or e¢ ciency.
Related Literature
Since the seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962) , matching markets have been the focus of a growing theoretical and experimental mechanism design literature. Some popular applications in the literature include the design of the National Resident Matching Program (cf. Roth, 1984; and Roth and Peranson, 1999) , the design of central student assignment mechanisms for U.S. public schools (cf Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) , the design of central kidney exchange clearing houses for kidney patients (cf. Ünver 2004, 2007) , and the design of coursebidding mechanisms at business schools (cf. Sönmez and Ünver, forthcoming).
Our paper lies at the intersection of the theoretical and the experimental literature on matching markets. On the theory side, our contribution is the reported equivalence of a real-life assignment mechanism with a celebrated mechanism from the theory of two-sided matching. To the best of our knowledge, there have only been two similar reports on the coincidence of a real-life mechanism with a Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism so far in the literature. The …rst is due to Roth (1984) who shows that the mechanism used by the National Resident Matching Program in the United States since 1951 until the 1990s to assign medical interns to hospital positions is actually an exact equivalent of the hospital-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism. More recently, Balinski and Sönmez (1999) show that the multi-category serial dictatorship, a mechanism used for student placement to colleges in Turkey, is actually equivalent to the college-proposing GaleShapley mechanism. Interestingly, as opposed to these two equivalences, ours is the …rst report on an equivalent agent-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism. Most notably, this equivalence enables us to single out NH4 as the most e¢ cient individually rational and fair mechanism; and as essentially the only individually rational, fair, and incentive compatible mechanism.
Recent theory has explored a wide range of applications for top trading cycles mechanisms as a result of their attractive e¢ ciency and incentives features. Several variations of top trading cycles mechanisms have been studied extensively in a number matching problems. Two well-known applications for which this kind of mechanism has proved promising are school choice and kidney exchange, discussed earlier. Sönmez (2002, 2006) . The former is the only experimental study of the present problem thus far, and we have already discussed it. The latter paper is an experimental study on three school choice mechanisms, which also includes a more subtle and complex counterpart of the top trading cycles mechanism. 17 Our experimental …ndings are also consistent with those of Chen and Sönmez (2006), who observe the Gale-Shapley mechanism to generate more e¢ cient outcomes than the complex counterpart of the top trading cycles mechanism introduced for the school choice context. 
The Model
Prior to the centralized assignment process, each existing tenant chooses whether to participate or not. Then a house allocation problem (with existing tenants) (Abdulkadiro¼ glu and Sönmez, 1999), or a problem for short, is given by 19 1: a …nite set of existing tenants I E+ who have chosen to participate, 2: a …nite set of newcomers I N ;
3: a …nite set of occupied houses
5: a …nite set of vacant houses H V ;
6: a priority ordering f over all agents, and is assumed to be strict. Formally, it is a one-to-one function f : f1; 2; : : : ; jI
Thus, agent f (1) has the highest priority; agent f (2) has the second highest priority; and so on.
Let F denote the set of all priority orderings.
For each agent i 2 I; preference relation P i is assumed to be strict. Let R i denote the weak preference relation associated with P i : Formally, we assume that R i is a linear order, i.e., a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation on H. That is, for any h; h 0 2 H; h R i h 0 if and only if h = h 0 or h P i h 0 : For expositional simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that the null house is the last option for each agent. Our analysis straightforwardly extends to the more general case. Let P i denote the set of all preferences for agent i; and let B = i2I P i .
Throughout, we shall suppress the …rst …ve components of a problem assuming that they are exogenously given and …xed. Hence, a problem is a pair (f; P ) consisting of a priority ordering and a list of preferences. An allocation is a list of assignments such that (1) every agent is assigned one house; and (2) no house other than the null house is assigned to more than one agent. Formally, it is a function :
Let (i) denote the assignment of agent i at : Let A denote the set of all allocations.
A mechanism ' is a systematic procedure that chooses an allocation for each problem. Formally, it is a function ' : F B ! A. Let '(f; P ) denote the allocation chosen by ' for the problem (f; P ) and let ' i (f; P ) denote the assignment of agent i at this allocation.
An allocation 2 A is individually rational if no participating existing tenant prefers the house she has been occupying to the house she is assigned at . Formally, for every i 2 I E+ ; (i)
An allocation 2 A is Pareto e¢ cient if its outcome cannot be improved by an allocation at which all agents are at least as well o¤ and at least one agent is strictly better o¤. Formally, there is no 2 A such that (i) R i (i) for all i 2 I and (j) P j (j) for some j 2 I: A mechanism ' is Pareto e¢ cient if for every (f; P ) 2 F B; '(f; P ) is Pareto e¢ cient.
In the present context, "fully" respecting the priority order f may con ‡ict with individual rationality. 20 Therefore, we propose and adopt the following intuitive "fairness" concept. An allocation 2 A is fair if whenever an agent prefers another agent's assignment to her own assignment at , then either (1) the other agent has higher priority than herself; or (2) the other agent is an existing tenant who is assigned her own house. Formally, for every i; j 2 I; if (j)
A mechanism ' is (dominant strategy) incentive compatible (or, strategy-proof) if it is a dominant strategy for each agent to truthfully report her preferences. Formally, for every (f; P ) 2 F B; every i 2 I; and every
Three Mechanisms
We next study three mechanisms of interest: the most common on-campus housing mechanism in the United States, an attractive theory mechanism, and a particular mechanism currently in use at MIT.
Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights
Several U.S. universities including Carnegie Mellon, Duke, Northwestern, the University of Michigan, and the University of Pennsylvania employ the random serial dictatorship with squatting rights (RSD) mechanism. The mechanism works as follows:
Initially, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the central assignment process, or keep her current house and stay out of the assignment process. In the former case, she gives up her occupied house, and it becomes available for allocation.
Consider a given house allocation problem (P; f ). Agents are successively asked to choose their top choice houses from the remaining ones: The …rst agent is assigned her top choice house; the second agent is assigned her top choice house among the remaining ones; and so on.
The main drawback of RSD is that since it cannot guarantee an existing tenant a house no worse than her current house, it is not individually rational. In fact, even though RSD is Pareto e¢ cient according to our model, since some existing tenants may choose not to participate, it may 21 Here, P i denotes the restriction of pro…le P to the set Infig:
not be Pareto e¢ cient within the set of all agents. Chen and Sönmez (2002) suggest that this aspect of the mechanism is one of its main de…ciencies in practice.
Top Trading Cycles
Abdulkadiro¼ glu and proposed the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism, which is based on Gale's top trading cycles idea (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) . TTC works as follows: 22 Initially, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the central assignment process, or keep her current house and stay out of the assignment process.
Consider a given house allocation problem (P; f ). Assign the …rst agent (according to f ) her top choice, the second agent her top choice among the remaining houses, and so on, until someone demands the house of an existing tenant. If at that point the existing tenant whose house is demanded is already assigned a house, then do not disturb the procedure. Otherwise, modify the TTC is Pareto e¢ cient, individually rational, and incentive compatible (Abdulkadiro¼ glu and . It achieves fairness only in a weak sense. 23 In their experimental study, Chen and Sönmez (2002) found that TTC induces higher participation rates and leads to more e¢ cient 22 The description of TTC we give below di¤ers from that of a direct adaptation of Gale's original idea to house allocation with existing tenants. Abdulkadiro¼ glu and have shown that the two alternative descriptions are nonetheless equivalent. Chen and Sönmez (2002) also used the version of TTC given below in their experiments. 23 Precisely speaking, in the following sense. Under TTC, it is possible that an agent, say i; may be assigned a house worse for her than a house an agent with lower priority, say j; is assigned. In fact, when this is the case, agent j is either an existing tenant who has been assigned her own house, or an existing tenant whose house has been assigned either to another existing tenant or to a newcomer with higher priority than j. outcomes than RSD.
New House 4
The next mechanism has been in use at residence New House 4 of MIT for about three decades. 24 The New House 4 (NH4) mechanism works as follows: 25 Initially, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the central assignment process, or keep her current house and stay out of the assignment process. Consider a given house allocation problem (P; f ).
1. The …rst agent (according to f ) is tentatively assigned her top choice among all houses, the next agent is tentatively assigned her top choice among the remaining houses, and so on, until a squatting con ‡ict occurs.
2. A squatting con ‡ict occurs if it is the turn of an existing tenant but every remaining house is worse than her current house. That means someone else, the con ‡icting agent, is tentatively assigned the existing tenant's current house. When this happens:
(a) the existing tenant is assigned her current house and removed from the process, and (b) all tentative assignments starting with the con ‡icting agent and up to the existing tenant are erased.
At this point the squatting con ‡ict is resolved and the process starts over with the con ‡icting agent. Every squatting con ‡ict that occurs afterward is resolved in a similar way.
The process is over when there are no houses or agents left. At this point all tentative assignments are …nalized. 24 We are not aware of any other universities using a similar mechanism. This mechanism is …rst reported by Abdulkadiro¼ glu and . 25 See http://scripts.mit.edu/~nh4/wiki/index.php?title=Housing_Rules for an online description of this mechanism. The housing system at residence New House 4 was crafted through a joint e¤ort between the president and the housing chair in the late 70's. (Personal communication with Sean Collins, the current president of New House 4.)
A Popular Mechanism from a Related Problem
The Gale-Shapley (deferred acceptance) mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962) has long dominated two-sided matching theory 26 because of its attractive stability and incentive properties. It has also been adopted by a number of real-life matching markets as a much more satisfactory alternative to the de…cient mechanisms it replaced. The most recent success of the Gale-Shapley mechanism has been in "school choice" applications in the United States. In a school choice problem there are a …nite set of students, a …nite set of schools, a list of student preferences over the schools including a no-school option, and a list of school-speci…c priority orderings 27 over all students. 28 The main objective in this application is to assign students to schools while accommodating the school-speci…c priority orderings. Shortly after being advocated for school choice, the Given the growing popularity and the success of the Gale-Shapley mechanism in matching markets, it is tempting to consider an adaptation of this mechanism for house allocation problems.
Nevertheless, despite the mathematical similarities between the two indivisible good allocation problems, there are two important di¤erences between house allocation and school choice that prevent us from immediately adapting the Gale-Shapley mechanism to house allocation. First, in school choice, but not in house allocation, for each school there is a separate (often di¤erent) priority ordering of students; and second, in school choice but not in house allocation, the individual rationality property is irrelevant since there is no conceptual analogue of existing tenants and their occupied houses. Therefore, we …rst provide a formal link between the two problems by transforming a given house allocation problem into an "associated school choice problem," and then propose a direct adaptation of the Gale-Shapley mechanism to our setting. 26 See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive survey on two-sided matching. 27 In the U.S., these priority orderings are typically based on a combination of a random lottery draw and speci…c policies of the particular school district. 28 A standard school choice problem also speci…es a capacity vector that denotes the capacity of each school. To facilitate the exposition here we consider a "special" school choice problem where each school has unit capacity.
Given a house allocation problem (I E+ ; I N ; H O ; H V; f; P ); in the associated school choice prob-
; the set of students is the set of all agents, the set of schools is the set of all houses, and the priority ordering for each house is constructed from f as follows: (1) 
In words, under this transformation, in the associated school choice problem, (1) the priority ordering for each vacant house coincides with the priority ordering f of the given house allocation problem; and (2) the priority ordering for each occupied house assigns the highest priority for this house to the corresponding existing tenant and exactly follows f in assigning the remaining priorities.
As with the house allocation problems, in the remainder of the paper, we shall suppress the set of agents I and the set of houses H and de…ne an associated school choice problem as a pair (F; P )
consisting of a list of house-speci…c priority orderings and a list of preferences. The de…nitions of an allocation and a mechanism identically apply in associated school choice problems. In school choice, a central consideration is "stability." Given a school choice problem (F; P ); an allocation is stable if there is no unmatched agent-house pair (i; h) such that either (i) agent i prefers h to her assignment and h is unassigned at ; or (ii) agent i prefers h to her assignment and has higher priority for h than the agent assigned to h. 29 Formally, there exists no (i; h) 2 I H such that either (i) h P i (i) and 1 (h) = ;, or (ii) h P i (i) and
Given a house allocation problem (f; P ), the outcome of the Gale-Shapley (GS) mechanism is obtained by applying the following deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) to the associated school choice problem (F; P ):
Step 1: Each agent applies to her top choice house. If an agent applies to the null house, then she is permanently assigned to it. For each remaining house, consider its applicants. The agent with the highest priority according to the priority ordering for that house is tentatively placed at that house. The rest are rejected. 29 The traditional stability notion also requires each agent to be assigned a house that is at least as good as the null house. (This is also referred as individual rationality.) Since the null house is the last option for each agent (and since each agent is acceptable to each house) in our model, this requirement is trivially satis…ed.
In general:
Step k: Each rejected agent applies to her next top choice house. If an agent applies to the null house, then she is permanently assigned to it. For each remaining house, consider its applicants at this step together with the agent (if any) who is currently tentatively placed to it. Among these, the agent with the highest priority according to the priority ordering for that house is tentatively placed at that house. The rest are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no agent is rejected any more. For any given house allocation problem, GS always leads to a stable allocation for the associated school choice problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962) . Moreover, this is the most favorable stable allocation to agents (i.e., it Pareto dominates any other stable allocation). Another remarkable feature of GS is that it is also incentive compatible (Dubins and Freedman, 1981 , and Roth, 1982).
Main Results
We start with a negative result on the trade-o¤s among the properties of house allocation mechanisms. It turns out that any three of the four desirable properties we discussed in Section 2 are compatible except for individual rationality, Pareto e¢ ciency, and fairness.
Proposition 1:
No mechanism is individually rational, Pareto e¢ cient, and fair. However, there exist mechanisms satisfying any other three properties simultaneously.
The …rst statement in Proposition 1 is in the same spirit as the classical impossibility between stability and Pareto e¢ ciency in two-sided matching due to Roth (1982) . For the second statement, consider the three mechanisms we previously discussed. RSD is Pareto e¢ cient, fair, and incentive compatible, but not individually rational. TTC is individually rational, Pareto e¢ cient, and incentive compatible, but not fair. 30 As will be shown shortly in Corollary 1, NH4 is individually rational, fair, and incentive compatible, but not Pareto e¢ cient. 31 A much weaker notion than Pareto e¢ ciency is "non-wastefulness." An allocation is nonwasteful 32 if no agent prefers an unassigned house to her assignment at this allocation. The next result presents a formal connection between the three properties of individually rationality, fairness, and non-wastefulness for a house allocation problem and the stability property for the associated school choice problem.
Proposition 2: Given a house allocation problem (f; P ); an allocation is individually rational, fair, and non-wasteful if and only if it is stable for the associated school choice problem (F; P ):
Much to our surprise, the above natural adaptation of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance procedure in fact always yields exactly the same outcome as NH4.
Theorem 1: NH4 and GS are equivalent.
Theorem 1, to the best of our knowledge, is the third reported coincidence of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance procedure with a real-life mechanism. Interestingly, contrary to the previous two reports, NH4 is an agent-proposing deferred acceptance procedure.
By Proposition 2, the equivalence result in Theorem 1 enables NH4 to claim all the attractive properties of GS.
Corollary 1: NH4 (as well as GS) is individually rational, fair, and incentive compatible.
The next result states that among all fair and individually rational mechanisms, NH4 is simply the most e¢ cient one. By Theorem 2 of Balinski and Sönmez (1999), the following corollary is now immediate. 31 See Abdulkadiroglu and for an example that shows that the NH4 outcome may not be Pareto e¢ cient. The actual housing rules at MIT also allow two agents to swap rooms if they have the consent of every agent with priorities between them. 32 Formally, an allocation 2 A is non-wasteful if for every i 2 I and every h 2 H; h P i (i) implies that there is j 2 I such that j (P ) = h: A mechanism ' is non-wasteful if for every (f; P ) 2 F B; '(f; P ) is non-wasteful. By Theorem 4 of Balinski and Sönmez (1999), NH4 turns out to be essentially the only incentive compatible, individually rational, and fair mechanism.
Corollary 3: NH4 (as well as GS) is the unique individually rational, fair, incentive compatible, and non-wasteful mechanism.
The leading theory mechanism for house allocation TTC and mechanism NH4 of MIT both satisfy three of the four properties in our desiderata. Theory suggests that TTC has the edge in terms of e¢ ciency and NH4 in terms of fairness. Our next goal will be to experimentally test the two mechanisms. This is the subject of the next section.
7 Experiment 1: NH4 vs. TTC
Experimental design
Our experiment compares the performances of NH4 and TTC in terms of e¢ ciency, participation of existing tenants, and truthful preference revelation. We implemented two treatments which di¤er only in the house allocation mechanism. For the sake of comparison, we tried to keep our design as close as possible to that of Chen and Sönmez (2002) ; participants were given the same description of TTC that was provided by Chen and Sönmez (2002) . As for NH4, we used the description of this mechanism that was provided by MIT. 33 We ran …ve replications for each treatment (NH4-1, NH4-2 3. There is a salient monetary di¤erence of $14 between the top and the last choice.
Both treatments, NH4 and TTC, were implemented as one-shot games of incomplete information. Each participant knew her own payo¤ table but not the others'payo¤ tables. Participants did know the number of existing tenants and newcomers and that payo¤ tables may di¤er. In both treatments, existing tenants were given an option to keep their houses and then not participate in the assignment mechanism. In line with Chen and Sönmez (2002) , participants were explained in the instructions the workings of the mechanisms, and in particular, how an existing tenant always obtains a house that is at least as good as her current house if she decides to participate.
Though the descriptions of the mechanisms make the individual rationality property easy to see, this is not true for the incentive compatibility property. In neither treatment were the subjects given any information about the incentive compatibility property of the mechanisms. If the instructions stated that the mechanisms are incentive compatible without explaining why, we would have generated an undesirable demand e¤ect. 34 That is, we would have revealed what constitutes appropriate behavior in our experiment and that could become the main force driving the results.
The experiment was conducted as follows. Once each participant was assigned to a computer, the experimenter read the instructions aloud, and questions were answered. Then, participants saw their own payo¤ table in the computer screen. Participants had 10 minutes to go over the instructions and make decisions. Existing tenants had the option to keep their current house (by choosing "out") or to participate in the mechanism (by choosing "in"). Existing tenants who chose "in"and newcomers submitted their list of preferences. Their ID numbers were introduced in a bowl by the experimenter, and a randomly chosen participant drew them one by one in order to generate the initial priority ordering. At this point the assignment of the houses was computed manually. At the end of the experiment participants were informed about the resulting assignment and were paid accordingly. 
Results
To evaluate the aggregate performance of NH4 vs. TTC, we compare the outcomes generated by each mechanism. Following the e¢ ciency concept used in the theoretical literature we use a novel way to test for e¢ ciency based on Pareto comparisons, the ordinal e¢ ciency test (OET). 2. For each pair, we randomly generate 10,000 di¤erent priority orderings. A test of equality of proportions shows that the participation rate of existing tenants under NH4 is signi…cantly higher than that under TTC: z = 2:7713 (p = 0:0028). Hence, we reject Hypothesis 2.
Table 3. Participation and Truthful Preference Revelation (NH4 vs TTC)
Mechanisms Group Participation rate Proportion of truthful preference revelation
TTC-3 3=8 5=7
TTC-4 4=8 6=8
TTC-5 3=8 4=7 Table 3 shows the participation rates in column 3 and the proportions of truthful preference revelation for each group in column 4.
Result 3 (Truthful Preference Revelation):
The overall proportion of truthful preference revelation is 80.4% under NH4, and 69.0% under TTC. The di¤erences in proportions of truthful preference revelation under NH4 and TTC are not statistically signi…cant.
A test of equality of proportions shows that the proportion of truthful preference revelation under NH4 is not signi…cantly di¤erent from that under TTC: z = 1:2250 (p = 0:1103). However, neither NH4 nor TTC induced thruthful preference revelation for all participants. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 3.
Results 1 to 3 show behavior deviating from theory in both the NH4 and the TTC treatments.
NH4 is found to achieve greater e¢ ciency than TTC. Since we do not …nd signi…cant di¤erences in truthful preference revelation (Result 3), we can conclude that participation is the key to why NH4 is outperforming TTC even though theory does not support this …nding.
8 Experiment 2: NH4 vs. GS
Experimental design
Our second experiment tests the theoretical equivalence of NH4 and GS. The design of this experiment follows the design of NH4 vs. TTC, but there are a few di¤erences. We again implemented two treatments, NH4 and GS, which di¤er only in the house allocation mechanism, or rather in the descriptions of the mechanisms given in the instructions.
We ran eight replications for each treatment (NH4v-1, NH4v-2,..., NH4v-5; GSv-1, GSv-2,..., Gsv-5) in two sessions for NH4 and three sessions for GS. Each session was run at the LINEEX experimental laboratory, University of Valencia, during spring 2010. Table 4 shows the payo¤ for each participant as a result of the house type she gets at the end of the experiment. Table 4 contains payo¤s in Euros obtained by using the Euro/$ exchange rate at the time and rounding to the closest integer. On top of the payments shown in Table 4 , participants were paid a 3EUR
show-up fee and 0.50EUR for each right answer in an 8-question post-experiment quiz. 36 Other than the di¤erent show-up fee and the reference to the post-experiment quiz, the NH4 instructions 36 The questionnaire is related to a di¤erent project. The questions are available upon request. NH4v-2 3=8 2=7
NH4v-3 7=8 9=11
NH4v-4 7=8 5=11
NH4v-5 7=8 7=11
NH4v-6 4=8 6=7
NH4v-7 6=8 8=10
NH4v-8 5=8 8=9
GSv-4 6=8 6=10
GSv-5 4=8 4=7
GSv-6 6=8 7=10
GSv-7 7=8 6=9
GSv-8 5=8 6=9 Table 5 shows participation rates in column 3 and proportions of truthful preference revelation for each group in column 4. Results 4 to 6 show behavior deviating from theory in both treatments of the experiment. We did not …nd signi…cant di¤erences in either participation or truthful preference revelation, and thus found no signi…cant di¤erence in e¢ ciency. Our experiments suggest that, in expected terms, NH4 and GS generate similar results. Consequently, we do not …nd any empirical evidence to prefer NH4 over GS or the other way around.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have studied the problem of …nding the "right" house allocation mechanism to allocate on-campus housing units to students from a market-design perspective. Abdulkadiro¼ glu and Sönmez (1999) and Chen and Sönmez (2002) advocated the prominent theory mechanism TTC as a serious candidate to replace the popular real-life mechanism RSD. In theory, TTC is Pareto e¢ cient, individually rational, and incentive compatible, but not fair. We analyzed the MIT house allocation mechanism known as NH4. In theory, NH4 is individually rational, incentive compatible and fair, but not Pareto e¢ cient. By Theorem 1, NH4 is however, the only constrained-e¢ cient mechanism among all mechanisms that are individually rational and fair.
We designed a laboratory experiment in which NH4 and TTC went head to head. Notwithstanding the theoretical advantage of TTC, NH4 turned out to be superior to TTC in terms of both participation rates and e¢ ciency. We designed a second experiment to test the theoretical equivalence of NH4 and GS in the lab. Not all the existing tenants chose to participate and preferences were not always revealed truthfully. Furthermore, we did not …nd any signi…cant di¤erences between the two mechanisms in terms of participation, truthful preference revelation, or e¢ ciency.
A second reason to be optimistic about the e¢ ciency performance of NH4 comes from a result due to Ergin (2002) : Loosely speaking, Ergin (2002) showed that GS tends to be more e¢ cient as the priority orderings for each house tend to be more "correlated." One feature of the particular adaptation of GS we have considered that might contribute to this possibility is that all the housespeci…c priority orderings for GS (the equivalent of NH4) are, by construction, generated from the same priority ordering.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For the …rst statement consider the following example. Suppose I N = f1; 2g; I E+ = f3g; H V = fa; bg; and H O = fh 3 g: Suppose the priority ordering f is 1-2-3.
Agents'preferences are as follows:
Any Pareto e¢ cient mechanism has to assign either agent 2 or agent 3 to house a; for otherwise agent 1 gets house a and is made better o¤ when she swaps it with the agent who gets house h 3 (who is also made better o¤ by this swap). Then, since agent 2 has higher priority, by fairness she should be assigned house a. This means, by individual rationality, agent 3 should be assigned house h 3 . Then agent 1 is assigned house b: But this clearly violates fairness.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Take an allocation 2 A. Clearly, condition (i) of stability of for (F; P ) is equivalent to the non-wastefulness of for (f; P ): Suppose that is individually rational, fair, and and non-wasteful for (f; P ) but not stable for (F; P ): Then there exists (i; h) 2 I H such that h P i (i) and
Suppose that is stable for (F; P ) but not individually rational for (f; P ). Then there exists j 2 I with h j P j (j): Since F h j (j) = 1 by construction, cannot be stable for (F; P ): Suppose that is stable for (F; P ) but not fair for (f; P ): Then there exist k; l 2 I with (k) P l (l)
such that f 1 (l) < f 1 (k) and either k 2 I N ; or k 2 I E+ and (k) 6 = h k : For both cases, by
Thus, cannot be stable for (F; P ):
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix a problem (f; P ): Let (F; P ) be the associated school choice problem.
We …rst introduce a useful notion of a "partial allocation" to denote the pseudo-allocations that form during the execution of the NH4 algorithm as well as the DA algorithm. Let I 0 I: A partial allocation is a function :
In this case, we say that partial allocation is de…ned on I 0 : Clearly, any allocation is also a partial allocation (de…ned on I). A partial allocation de…ned on I 0 is fair for a set of agents I 00 I 0 if for all i; j 2 I 00 ; whenever (j) P i (i); then either f (j) < f (i); or j 2 I E+ with (j) = h j :
McVitie and Wilson (1970) showed that under the DA algorithm, the ordering according to which agents make proposals to houses has no e¤ect on the outcome, and proposed an equivalent version of the DA algorithm, where agents make their applications according to any given ordering.
To prove Theorem 1 we use the McVitie-Wilson version of the DA algorithm in which agents apply to houses in turn according to the ordering f . More precisely, it will be convenient to think of the DA algorithm in the following way:
First, agent f (1) applies to her favorite house, say, to house h 1 . Since there are no previous applicants, she is tentatively assigned to her favorite house at the partial allocation that forms.
Second, agent f (2) applies to her favorite house, say, to house h
Otherwise, agent f (2) is tentatively assigned to h 2 at the partial allocation that forms. If some agent is rejected from house h 2 in either case, then she applies to her next favorite house as in the usual DA algorithm.. . . In general, agent f (k) applies to her favorite house, say, to house h k : If h k received a previous application and
to h k at the partial matching that forms: If some agent is rejected from house h k in either case, then she applies to her next favorite house. Similarly, any subsequently rejected agent applies to her next favorite house, and the process continues as in the usual DA algorithm until no agent is rejected any more; and so on.
The following observations will be useful in proving Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Any partial (and tentative) allocation obtained throughout the NH4 algorithm is fair for the agent set it is de…ned on. Thus, NH4 is fair. Similarly, any partial (and tentative) allocation obtained throughout the DA algorithm is fair for the agent set it is de…ned on. Thus, GS is fair.
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Proof. Take any partial allocation : I 0 ! H that forms at some instance of the NH4 algorithm. Let i 2 I 0 and h = (i): There are two cases to consider: Case 1. i is not a squatting agent: Consider the instance of the algorithm when i is assigned h: When it is the turn of agent i; she is assigned her best choice among the remaining houses.
This implies that any house that she prefers to h must be previously assigned to a higher priority agent than i, or to its owner because of a squatting con ‡ict. Then we conclude that for all j 2 I 0 ;
Case 2. i is a squatting agent: Clearly, h = h i : Consider the instance of the algorithm when i is assigned h: When it is the turn of agent i; all remaining houses are worse for her than h i .
Thus agent i squats and all the (tentative) assignments starting with the con ‡icting agent and up to agent i are erased. Next, the con ‡icting agent is to be assigned her top choice among the remaining houses. Note that the set of remaining houses at this point is a strict subset of the set of remaining houses when the con ‡icting agent was (tentatively) assigned h i : Since the preferences of the agents who have higher priority than i but weakly lower priority than the con ‡icting agent are …xed, when it is the turn of agent f (f 1 (i) + 1); the set of remaining houses is a strict subset of the set of remaining houses at the point agent i squatted. Consequently, agent f (f 1 (i) + 1)
cannot be assigned a house that i prefers to h i : Combining this with Case 1 implies that for all 37 Clearly, Proposition 2 also implies that GS is fair. j 2 I 0 ; if (j) P i (i); then either f (j) < f (i); or j 2 I E+ with (j) = h j :
Take any partial allocation 0 : I 0 ! H that forms at some instance of the DA algorithm. Let i 0 2 I 0 and h 0 = (i 0 ): Then until this point agent i 0 must have been rejected by all houses that she prefers to h 0 : Hence, any such house must be tentatively holding an agent who has higher priority than i 0 according to F: But the tentatively held agent has higher priority for that house according to F only if she has higher priority than i 0 according to f; or if she is the owner of that house. Thus, for all j 2 I 0 ; if 0 (j) P i (i 0 ); then either f (j) < f (i 0 ); or j 2 I E+ with (j) = h j :
Q.E.D. We give a direct proof of Theorem 1. We show that the set of existing tenants who are assigned their own houses are the same under the two mechanisms at the problem (f; P ). Then, since both algorithms'outcomes are fair by Lemma 1 and non-wasteful, 38 by Lemma 2 they have to choose the same allocation. Let and respectively be the NH4 allocation at (f; P ) and the GS allocation at (F; P ).
Let S = fi 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i T g I E+ be the set of agents who squatted in the NH4 algorithm.
W.l.o.g., let the subscripts denote the order with which they squatted. We show that for each i 2 S; (i) = h i : We argue by induction.
Consider agent i 1 : We observe how the tentative and partial allocation is obtained until just before the …rst squatting con ‡ict under the NH4 algorithm. First, agent f (1) is tentatively assigned 38 By Proposition 1, GS is non-wasteful. The fact that NH4 is also non-wasteful can be straightforwardly veri…ed. when it is the turn of agent i 1 to start to apply, since 1 = 1 ; she applies to all the houses she prefers to h i 1 (if any), and in turn gets rejected from each such house since it is now tentatively assigned to some agent who, by the construction of F , has higher priority for it than i 1 . Then agent i 1 applies to h i 1 : Since she has the highest priority for h i 1 ; she is tentatively assigned to h i 1 :
From this point on, any agent who applies to h i 1 is rejected, i.e., i 1 is permanently assigned to h i 1 . Hence, (i 1 ) = h i 1 :
Suppose that for each i 2 ; : : : ; i k 1 2 S; we have (i 2 ) = h i 2 ; : : : ; (i k 1 ) = h i k 1 : [Induction hypothesis] We show that (i k ) = h i k : Let k be the partial allocation that forms under the NH4 algorithm just before agent i k squats. Note that k is de…ned on I 0 k = ff (1); f (2); : : : ; f (f 1 (i k ) 1)g: Let k be the partial allocation that forms under the DA algorithm just before agent i k starts to apply. Clearly, k is also de…ned on I 0 k : By Lemma 1, both k and k are fair for I 0 : Since they are both also non-wasteful, by Lemma 2 and the induction hypothesis, k = k : Under the DA algorithm, when it is the turn of agent i k to start to apply, since k = k ; she applies to all the houses she prefers to h i k (if any), and in turn gets rejected from each such house since it is now tentatively assigned to some agent who has higher priority for it than i k . Then agent i k applies to
